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ABSTRACT

Philosophers and Cognitive Scientists have become accustomed to distinguishing the
first person perspective from the third person perspective on reality or experience.
This is sometimes meant to mark the distinction between the “objective” or
“intersubjective” attitude towards things and the “subjective” or “personal”
attitude. Sometimes, it is meant to mark the distinction between knowledge and mere
opinion. Sometimes it is meant to mark the distinction between an essentially private
and privileged access to an inner world and a merely inferential or speculative access
to that world. No doubt there are other uses as well. But I don't care about this
dichotomy here, or indeed any of these putative distinctions it is alleged to mark.
Instead, I want to call attention to the central role of the less often acknowledged
grammatical and phenomenological category, that of the second person. This
category is essential not only for understanding the development of selfunderstanding, but also for the development of the moral sense that allows us to
participate in the societies that constitute us as persons. The task of moral education
is the cultivation of care for second persons. But we do so by extending not self-regard
(for that is inextensible—others are not oneself), but by extending the spontaneous
caring response we have for those with whom we immediately interact—second
persons. Our moral lives, I will argue, like our cognitive lives, cannot be understood
without understanding the special nature of second person relationships. In short, I
will argue that the second person perspective is in fact essential to the constitution of
human subjectivity, and that it permeates all forms of interpersonal consciousness and
even self-consciousness.
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Love is just like breathing when it’s true;
And I’m free in you. The Indigo Girls

Philosophers and Cognitive Scientists have become accustomed to
distinguishing the first person perspective from the third person perspective on
reality or experience. This is sometimes meant to mark the distinction between
the “objective” or “intersubjective” attitude towards things and the “subjective”
or “personal” attitude.1 Sometimes, it is meant to mark the distinction between
knowledge and mere opinion. Sometimes it is meant to mark the distinction
between an essentially private and privileged access to an inner world and a
merely inferential or speculative access to that world. No doubt there are other
uses as well. But this dichotomy is not the topic of this essay.2
Instead, I want to call attention to the central role of the less often
acknowledged grammatical and phenomenological category, that of the second
person. This category is essential not only for understanding the development
of self-understanding, but also for the development of the moral sense that
allows us to participate in the societies that constitute us as persons. The task of
moral education is the cultivation of care for second persons. But we do so by
extending not self-regard (for that is inextensible—others are not oneself), but
by extending the spontaneous caring response we have for those with whom we
immediately interact—second persons. Our moral lives, I will argue, like our
cognitive lives, cannot be understood without understanding the special nature
of second person relationships. In short, I will argue that the second person
perspective is in fact essential to the constitution of human subjectivity, and that
it permeates all forms of interpersonal consciousness and even selfconsciousness.
I will first review some important developmental evidence for the special
role of second persons before turning to some cross-cultural and
phenomenological perspectives on this question. I will conclude with attention
to the ethical dimensions of the second person perspective.

1

The literature on this putative distinction is vast. See Gallagher (2012), Kriegel (2009),
Thompson (2014), and Zahavi (2008) for good examples.
2 See Garfield (2015), chapter 6 for my critique of this distinction.
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1. Some Developmental Evidence for the Importance of the Second Person
Vasudevi Reddy has done more than any other recent developmental
psychologist to demonstrate that second person engagement is foundational to
the origins of subjectivity. Her empirical work and her reflection on that work
provides compelling evidence regarding how early human infants recognize
second persons, and how central that recognition is not only to their later
recognition of third persons, but, more importantly, to their own selfconception as first persons.
In (2003) Reddy asks, “what does it take to be aware that someone is
attending to you?” (397) This apparently simple question raises two others that
constitute the focus of the studies she reports in this piece: first, what does it
take to recognize another’s attention?; second, what does it take to recognize
oneself as the object of that attention. One might think that these two are
independent, and indeed, she notes, many have argued that self-representation
arrives in the second year, as measured by mirror self-recognition, while
awareness that others have mental states does not emerge until the fourth year
when theory of mind tasks are passed.
Reddy argues that this deconstruction of a single question into two is
misguided, and that self-and-other recognition, or recognition of the first
person in the context of the second, co-emerge very early. A she puts it, “… the
awareness of self as the object of others’ attention…must lead to, rather than
result from, representations of self and other as psychological entities. This
perspective assumes what one might call a ‘second-person’ approach to the
developing awareness of self and other.” (Ibid.) That is, Reddy argues, our
awareness of ourselves as subjects is coeval with our awareness of those who
address us and who we address: first-person and second-person are co-emergent,
and are ontogenetically prior to the third person. We will find reason to
complicate this picture somewhat a bit later.
Reddy provides evidence for this co-emergence through observation of
infant-parent interactions in first two years of life. By age 2-4 months, infants
respond to another’s gaze with pleasure or fear, and attempt to engage attention
and gaze. By 6-8 months, they monitor the gaze of others and orient their own
gaze in response. Importantly, this monitoring, she argues, includes affective
awareness. As early as two months of age, she shows, infants show coyness,
embarrassment, pride, and pleasure and respond to the affective states of those
with whom they interact. The affective and the cognitive co-emerge, and emerge
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essentially in these dyadic contexts. In short, the emergence of subjectivity is
inextricably bound up with the recognition of another’s attention and mood, and
so with the primitive awareness of oneself as object for another subject. The
second person is inextricably bound up with the first.
This picture is enriched in Reddy (2016). In that essay she argues
persuasively for two important theses: first, early dyadic infant-parent
interactions involve the spontaneous perception of action as intentional on the
part of the infant; second, these interactions are often dialogical, and so involve
the explicit representation of subjective difference between the participants;
that is, even pre-linguistic infants represent the difference in perspective
between themselves and those with whom they interact, and the distinct roles
each takes in dyadic interactions.
The first point is straightforward—even obvious—but profound in its
implications. Infants interact with their caregivers not through language, but
through non-linguistic actions. Those actions, whether playful or protesting,
are interpreted. A parent reaches for an infant, and the infant prepares her body
to be lifted; she interprets the gesture as a reaching for her. A parent plays
peekaboo, and the infant interprets the covering and revealing of the face as an
enticement to play, etc. The infant makes facial expressions or gestures to attract
the attention of the caregiver or to engage him in interaction. The infant is hence
immediately attributing intentionality, interest, and subjectivity to the other,
taking the second person to be a person capable of experiencing her own actions
and with intentions of his own.3
And herein consists the recognition of difference, a phenomenon equally
important to appreciate if we are to understand the significance of the second
person. For these interactions are not only dyadic; they are dialogical, with each
participant taking a different role. The infant recognizes the difference in
perspective, in intention, and in capacity of the second person. Subjectivity is
hence understood, from the beginning of human life, not as homogenous, but as
heterogeneous; the infant’s own subjective states, intentions and experiences
are not simply projected onto the dialogical partner; they are differentiated from
them. Minds constitute a multiplicity, with many different instances. And this
long before “theory of mind” emerges in the fourth year of life, as measured by
passing false belief tasks, and well before the acquisition of competence with the
3

See also Carpendale and Lewis (2004, 2006, 2010) for additional evidence for these
phenomena. Carpendale and Lewis also emphasize the importance of early dyadic interactions for
the development both of social intelligence and of self-understanding.
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semantics or syntax of sentential complement clauses that enable children to
succeed at these tasks, suggesting an important dichotomy between implicit and
explicit theory of mind. (de Villiers and de Villiers 1999; Garfield, Peterson and
Perry 2001; Fenici 2012, 2017a, 2017b)
In (2007) Reddy extends this picture to the third and fourth years of life,
examining the onset of deception. Deception is, by definition, the attempt to
produce a false belief in the mind of another. One might think, then, that a child
could not practice deception until she masters Theory of Mind. But this is simply
false. As Reddy shows, children tell falsehoods deliberately, knowing them to be
false, and often with the clear intent to convince a conversation partner of their
truth, well before they can pass Theory of Mind tasks. Deception, like any
communicative act, is initially dyadic. And children learn to deceive as they
learn to tell the truth, in conversation with others they take to be gullible, and
so whose beliefs and intentions they must recognize as different from their
own, but as sensitive to what they say. If Theory of Mind is the capacity to
attribute false belief to third persons, it is scaffolded in part by the ability to
attribute them to second persons.
Reddy (2018) draws these insights together into a comprehensive
account of the origins of social cognition in the second-person perspective.
She writes:
The typical development of social cognition… originates in… secondperson engagements that irresistibly involve the infant, changing not only the
infant cognizer’s capacity to cognize, but also that which develops to be
cognized. The emotional involvement of persons, in particular those most
salient of emotional involvements that occur in second-person engagements
where the infant is directly addressed or responded to by another, becomes the
crucible of cognition. (433-434)
But if cognition and affective maturation begin in early-childhood
second-person interaction, the second person does not lose importance once
one becomes explicitly aware of third persons and of oneself as part of a
community of second and third persons. Second persons remain important,
Reddy emphasizes, through adulthood. Reddy continues:
Both types of experiences, second-person involvements and third-person
observations, must influence each other and both may be necessary even for
stable pre-inferential perceptions of other minds. … But being addressed as a
You and addressing the other as a You arouses emotional responses differently
from watching someone else being addressed, and engenders—even if briefly—
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a mutuality and suspension of separateness. The other becomes a person to
you, someone who knocks you off balance or enters your consciousness in a
more fundamental way than when you are largely untouched by the other, or
just watching them. (438)
We respond in special ways—with distinct neural signatures—to being
addressed by our names, or even as “you,” and our affective arousal is higher
when in dyadic interactions than when observing others. 4 We not only become
who we are in early second-person interactions, but we manifest who we are in
these interactions in maturity. 5
Reddy (439-442) argues that such engagement requires a complex coconstituted intentional situation: first, we must be open to engage with others.
To be open in this sense is to see others as persons, as subjects in their own
right. We do not address trees or tables as You, only persons. And address
presupposes the possibility of uptake. But this is not enough. To address
another as a second person presupposes that the other recognizes the
addressee as a person. I do not take myself to be addressed by the sound of the
surf or thunder, or by birds. Address requires that I find myself in a dyad in
which I not only recognize the other’s personhood, but in which I am also
respected by the other as a person. This constitutes a kind of two way street.
But there is a higher-level requirement as well. If I am truly to address you,
whether as an infant or as an adult, I have to be able to recognize the fact that
you recognize me. If I do not, then even if you might take me to be addressing
you, I cannot take myself to be doing so. Second-person recognition, even in
infancy, is hence an act of higher-order cognition in which I take you to take
me as someone whose messages are worthy of uptake. But at the same time, to
4

There are dozens of studies that confirm this result. Here are a few. Grossman, Parise and
Friederici (2010), using near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS), found that specific adjacent areas of
the prefrontal cortex are active in infants in response to communicative intention from adults, one
that responds to eye contact and one to the use of the infant’s name; this response is subserved by
a common area in older children and adults. Farroni, Csibra, Simion and Johnson (2002) used an
ERP study to show that specific neural activity responds to eye contact in 2-5 day old infants.
Grossman, Johnson, Farroni and Csibra (2007) show that specific gamma band oscillation in
infant brains responds to eye contact from human faces. Turning to adults, Kamp, Frith and Frith
(2003) find that hearing one’s own name activates the paracingulate cortext and temporal poles,
areas closely associated with the attribution of mental states to others; Hietanen and Hitanen
(2017) find that eye contact with a genuine interlocutor increases self-awareness and the use of
first-person pronouns.
5 Note, for instance, how effective Śāntideva and Patrul Rinpoche’s prose is in virtue of their
forceful use of the second person. Thanks to Emily McRae for pointing this out.
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do so is to see myself as just such a being. Reddy’s work (as well as that of
others we have cited) hence shows that first person awareness of ourselves as
subjects is hence possible in the context of second-person relations.
This developmental story is important because it demonstrates just how
co-constituted our subjectivity is. We may take ourselves naively to be
independent subjects who accidentally discover others; we may take our access
to our own minds to be more fundamental than our access to others; we may
take association to be somehow accidental or optional. But we are wrong to
do so. We become persons in interactions with second persons; and as persons,
we fully manifest who we are only in such interactions. I now leave the terrain
of developmental psychology for an examination of adult subjectivity. Here we
will see that the second-person perspective is deeply enmeshed with the firstand third-person perspectives.
2. The Second-Person Perspective as Constitutive of Adult Subjectivity
As adults, as members of epistemic communities, and as language users, we
are accustomed to claiming a kind of epistemic authority over our own inner
states. In the ordinary case, we are manifestly more competent to report on
our own inner lives than are others. This prima facie first person authority,
however, is often used as the thin end of an epistemological and metaphysical
wedge in the enterprise of splitting the cognitive subject from its object, and
in the enterprise of splitting self-knowledge from the knowledge of others in a
more categorial sense. We see this tendency in Indian and Western
philosophy alike.
When we drive this wedge too hard, we end up constituting a special
domain of inner life to which we have immediate, infallible access, as opposed
to an outer world including others to whose own inner lives we have at best
inferential, mediate access. Epistemic privilege stands against skepticism, and
reflexive knowledge is valorized while other minds are problematized. The
gulf between the first-person and the third-person perspective then leads to a
complex metaphysics comprising qualitative properties corresponding to
physical properties, possible zombies, etc… This is one face of the subjectobject duality that both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra philosophers alike argue
that we project onto our experience, distorting it and generating the mass of
confusion that Buddhist philosophers argue constitutes samsara. (Garfield
2015)
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I will show that re-introducing the second-person perspective offers a
way to reconcile these dichotomies. It allows us a different way of
conceptualizing self-knowledge as well as the knowledge of other minds that
explains the epistemic authority of self-knowledge. It also shows why,
nonetheless, self-knowledge is absolutely continuous with our knowledge of
others, and implicates neither the duality of inner and outer nor the spooky
metaphysics and hyperbolic epistemology those dichotomies entail. To
appreciate this requires us to see the degree to which our self-understanding
is fundamentally hermeneutical, and the degree to which the acts of
interpretation in which we engage are mediated by conversation and address.
We saw above how our subjectivity is constituted developmentally in
second-person interactions, and that we can only know ourselves as subjects
to the extent that others address us, and that we address others, in the context
of a mutual expectation of understanding. Ontogenesis here constitutes
ontology. As essentially social organisms, we become constituted as subjects
who address one another, and who are worthy of address; as we acquire
language, we come to address one another in that medium, and our selfunderstanding as well as our understanding of others is permeated by the
metaphor of linguistic meaning. When we ascribe others beliefs, desires,
intentions, hopes and fears, we do so with propositional content; it is less
obvious, but no less true that we do the same when we come to understand
ourselves. (Sellars 1963) Once language is in the picture, the pre-linguistic
innocence that guides our interactions is lost forever. For this is the moment
when we become fully responsible to a norm-constituting community in order
to make and to absorb meaning. (See Wittgenstein 1991; Sellars 1949, 1951,
1963, 1969)
In order to explore more deeply this entanglement of self and other, and
of self-knowledge with the knowledge of other minds, I now turn to the work
of the early twentieth century philosopher, KC Bhattacharyya, perhaps the
first philosopher to appreciate fully the importance of the second person in the
constitution of first-person consciousness. We will see that his insights
anticipate those of many better-known philosophers, and that they provide a
compelling frame for the empirical work we discussed above. In The Subject
as Freedom (1930) Bhattacharyya argues for an intimate connection between
the first-, second- and third-person perspectives in the constitution of
subjectivity. The first-person pronoun ‘I’, he argues, is “speakable,” but not
“meanable.” The meanable roughly coincides with Kant’s knowable.
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Whatever can be designated intersubjectively as an object falls, according to
Bhattacharyya, under the head of the “meanable.” 6
In ¶¶2-3 (87-88), Bhattacharyya explicitly ties meaning to intersubjective
agreement and availability of referents for terms. This anticipation of
Wittgenstein and Sellars takes him a bit beyond Kant, of course, but the ideas
are nonetheless congruent. The speakable, on the other hand, is whatever can
be spoken of or communicated about through language. It is a broader category
than the meanable, since there may be some things we can communicate—that
are not nonsense—even though we cannot assign them meanings. So, we can talk
about ourselves, even though there is no term that can mean the self.
The subject cannot be taken to be meant, for it is not intersubjectively
available as the referent for I. Nobody but me, Bhattacharyya argues, is aware of
my own subjectivity in the way that it is present to me as subject, and so there is
no way to establish a convention of reference or meaning for the I that designates
it in that mode of presentation.7 But he argues, the first person pronoun has a
unique role in designating the self. Were I to refer to myself using a name or a
description, in the third person, the possibility of error through
misidentification intrudes. 8 But the first-person indexical gets immediately,
directly, at the speaking subject, and is so understood by addressees as well as
by the speaker. So, although the word I has no meaning in this strict sense, it is
not meaningless. It conveys something, and is understood; indeed, it is
indispensible. It is therefore speakable, but not meanable.
But even a non-meanable speakable gets its point only in discourse, or
address. And, as we have seen, whenever we speak, we address one another as
subjects in dialogue with one another. In this discussion at the close of The
distinction is drawn in the first paragraph of The Subject as Freedom: “Object is what is
meant, including the object of sense-perception and all contents that have necessary reference to
it. Object as the meant is distinguished form the subject or the subjective of which there is some
awareness other than meaning-awareness. The subjective cannot be a meaningless word: to be
distinguished from it, it must be a significant speakable and yet if it be a meant content, it would
be but object. It can thus be neither asserted nor denied to be a meant content and what cannot be
denied need not be assertable. Apparently, the significant speakable is wider than the meanable:
a content to be communicated and understood need not be meant”. (87)
7 Compare to Wittgenstein’s discussion of discourse about inner states in Philosophical
6 This

Investigations.

8 As Sidney Shoemaker was famously to point out in (1968), an insight developed further by John

Perry (1979). So, I might erroneously believe myself to be John Perry. I would then misidentify
John Perry as the person thinking this thought. I cannot, however be wrong about the fact that I
am thinking this thought.
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Subject as Freedom, Bhattacharyya recurs to an important insight he defends
near the beginning of the book: to take oneself as the referent of I is to take
addressees as you, others as he or she. In short, he argues in the first chapter of

the book, the possibility of speech—and hence subjectivity—is conditional upon
intersubjectivity, simply because speech presupposes both addresses who can
be expected themselves to be subjects capable of self-reference, and meaningconstituted conventions instituted by others whose subjectivity we also presume.
He deploys that insight at the denouement of the discussion to argue that to
understand oneself as a subject is to understand oneself as a member of a class
of those capable of introspective self-awareness:
120. The realization of what a speaker means by the word I is the hearer’s
awareness of a possible introspection. Such awareness is as much knowledge as
actual introspection. The speaker calls himself I and may be understood by the
hearer as you. As thus understood, the introspective self is individual, not an
individual being—for introspection is not a subjective being like feeling—but the
function of addressing another self. The speaker does not understand himself
through the meaning of the word I: his introspection is through the word and not
through its meaning and is less a self-knowing than a self-revealing, revealing to
a possible understander of the word I. Yet as the addressing attitude is only
implicit, it is to him accidental and posterior to his self-knowing. To the
understanding self, however, although he understands the speaker’s selfknowing because he is himself self-knowing, his understanding of the other I is
primary while his own self-knowing is accidental and secondary. The speaker
knows himself in implicitly revealing to the hearer and the hearer knows the
speaker in implicitly knowing himself. … There are thus two cases—self-intuition
with other-intuition implicit in it and other-intuition with self-intuition implicit
in it. Both are actual knowledge… Because the word I is at once the symbol and
the symbolized, it cannot be said to have simply the symbolizing function….
(161-162)
121. Actual introspection is implicitly social, being a speaking or addressing or
self-evidencing to another possible introspection or self… (162)

In virtue of the role of I as a vocable, but non-denoting term (here note as well
the anticipations of Anscombe on the first person),9 this speaking of the self, and
hence fully-fledged adult self-consciousness itself, Bhattacharyya argues, is
parasitic on the very possibility of language, and so the existence of addressees
who are also capable of using the first, and the second person pronouns. So, self9 Balslev (2013 pp. 136-137) also notes the anticipation of Anscombe.
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knowledge and therefore also genuinely human subjectivity, are essentially
intersubjective phenomena, not private.10 Bhattacharyya hence shows that there
is no knowledge of subjectivity whatsoever outside of the context of social
interaction and discourse.
So, Bhattacharyya, like Reddy, emphasizes the special role of second
persons, in virtue of the facts that speech presupposes address and that we
become reflective subjects in the context of address. Moreover, Bhattacharyya
argues, we can only fully understand ourselves and our interlocutors each as
addressees and as addressors to the extent that we recognize and follow the
meaning-constituting linguistic rules and conventions that are grounded in the
practices of a community of third persons. Otherwise, we cannot take our own
statements or thoughts to be meaningful at all. So, just as the first-person
perspective is entirely bound up with the second-person perspective—
ontogenetically, subjectively, constitutively and phenomenologically—the
second-person perspective comes, as a result of language acquisition and entry
into a linguistic community, to be, for adults, entirely bound up with the third.
The point of joining Reddy’s and Bhattacharyya’s accounts is that when we
do so, we can see that we could never first encounter ourselves, then our
immediate interlocutors, and then others, building our understanding of our
conspecifics by analogy in an ever-widening circle. Instead, we come in infancy
to understand ourselves and our interlocutors together; this understanding
becomes articulate and reflective through the mediation of language and a raft
of other social conventions, and again is possible only in the context of a
seamless understanding of the community in which we participate and of our
mutual relations to one another in that community that constitute the
normativity that makes understanding possible. For, as I noted above, to
perceive someone—whether myself, my partner, or a stranger—as making sense,
or as having an inner life, is always an interpretative act, whether that
interpretation is explicit or immediate in the perception of intentionality. The
sapience in adult Homo sapiens is always hermeneutic, and so always beholden
to norms, and so always collective. In taking myself to be a person, I take you to
be a person; in taking you to be a person, I take them to be persons; that is, I take
all of us to be committed and responsible to norms of hermeneutical rationality.
I also take us all to be collectively committed to the constitution of a rule10

For more on why this is the case regarding propositional attitude attributions, see Garfield,
Peterson and Perry, op. cit.; for a more extended discussion of the social dimensions of
personhood and self-knowledge in the context of Hume’s philosophy, see Garfield 2019.
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governed linguistic community in the context of which meaning can be
constituted, and so in which fully articulate address is possible.
This has deep ramifications for the nature of introspection, for privileged
access, and for our understanding of the minds of others. Introspection, on this
model, is not inner perception, but self-interpretation. First person authority is
not infallible perceptual access to our inner states, but rather, as Sellars argued
so forcefully in (1963), reflects the skill we have in understanding and
predicting our own behavior. We are better at this than we are at interpreting
others, but we are fallible; and we are better at interpreting others than we might
think. First person-third person asymmetry in the knowledge of minds is, then,
a matter of degree, and not of kind.11
When we assign mental states to others, we might take it that our
attributions are true or false depending on the presence of absence of
independently existent inner states that are truthmakers for these claims. To
think this way, as Wittgenstein argues in (1991), is to work one’s way into the
“problem of other minds.” The problem of other minds so posed is a double
problem, with both an epistemological and a semantic face. Epistemologically,
the problem is that we can have at best only inferential knowledge of the minds
of others, and no good inductive reasons for thinking that others have minds at
all. After all, the only minds we have ever directly experienced, on this view, are
our own. Semantically, since, on this account, we can in principle never have
access to the truthmakers of our attributions of inner states, we literally have no
11

A few qualifications are in order here. First, the hermeneutical story I tell about intentional
interpretation is certainly not the only alternative to a classical model according to which we have
immediate access to our own minds and only inferential access to others. One might have a
perceptual model of mental knowledge, for instance. (See Gallagher 2012 and Zahavi 2008, for
instance.) But my point in the present essay is to press the case for the plausibility of this model,
and to demonstrate its advantages as an account of the development of our understanding of the
mental. Carruthers (2011), despite the fact that we disagree regarding much of the broader
landscape, defends a similar position regarding privileged access.
I should also point out that there is an important asymmetry in certain kinds of reports of mental
states between the first and the third person cases. We often “report” our own mental states not
as a consequence of introspection or reflection, but rather as professions, effectively actualizing
what Sellars liked to call “short-term propensities to speak out loud” by in fact speaking out loud,
producing candid utterances that manifest our beliefs, desires, or even sensory experiences. It is
the possibility of this kind of expression that often underlies the suspicion of a deep asymmetry
between first- and third-person knowledge of the mental. But these are not cases in which we
express knowledge of our own minds, but rather in which our states of mind are manifested, both
to ourselves and to others. See Garfield (1989).
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idea what it would be for these attributions to be true or false. And in that case,
we literally have no idea what we mean when we ascribe psychological states to
others.
This apparent problem arises from the supposed asymmetry between firstperson and third-person attribution. If our own mental states are immediately
available to us, but those of others are invisible, there is no possibility of
understanding mental state ascription, or knowing the minds of others; but also
no possibility of knowing our own, as to know our own states is to know them as
instances of kinds. The second-person perspective, and its hermeneutic model
of understanding shows the way out of this particular fly-bottle. For on this
model, ascriptions of mental states are not hostage to independent truthmakers
in any case; they are acts of interpretation, and like all such acts are answerable
only to the hermeneutical norms, not to correspondence. (See also Kusch 1997
and Garfield 2015 for a defense of the hermeneutical account of selfunderstanding.)
This is not, however, an anti-realist, or an eliminativist view of the mental.
For the absence of truthmakers does not entail an absence of truth.
Interpretation, on this view, does not reflect, so much as constitute, the reality
of our cognitive lives. Interpretation, that is, is constitutive, when taken as a
whole; not reflective of pre- existing psychological reality, although any single
attribution stands or falls on the grounds of its harmony with all others. That is,
while the entire ensemble of social and hermeneutic conventions in which we
participate may constitute the context in which it is true that I believe that Oslo
is the capital of Norway, once that context is in place, there is a clear fact of the
matter regarding whether or not I hold this belief. This is like so many normconstituted institutions. We do not discover money, but create it by interpreting
various bits of paper, metal and states of computing machinery as monetary; but
this does not mean that there is no truth of the matter regarding whether a
particular note is a dollar note, or what my bank balance is. The whole is created;
but it creates a context in which particular statements can be true or false in
virtue of the interpretations already assigned to others.
For this reason there can be no “problem of other minds” any more than
there can be a “problem of other dollars.” To be a mind is not to house hidden
inner particulars; it is to interpret and to be interpreted; to address and to be
addressed; to participate in the complex human conversation. We each know
immediately that we are minds not through introspection, but through
participation. We know that others are minds not through inference and not
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through clairvoyance, but through co-participation. To allow ourselves to be
addressed by, or to address, another is to take her to be a person, to have a mind;
it is at the same time to take ourselves to be persons. This phenomenon of
address requires neither reflexive self-consciousness, qualitative experience,
behavioral evidence, nor any of the other supposedly empirical markers of the
mental proposed by those who take this to be an empirical, rather than a
normative, matter.
If we turn to an Indian Buddhist context, this second-person,
hermeneutical approach to subjectivity and intersubjectivity gives us another
perspective from which to see why persons are conventional, or lokavyav̄ ahar̄ a
entities, as opposed to independently existent selves or ātman, replete with
independently inherent intentional and qualitative properties. To say that we are
socially constructed is not just to say that some superficial properties, such as
our social status, or occupations, are constructed socially, or that some of our
preferences and habits reflect our cultures. All of that is true, but it only
scratches the surface. Once we adopt the perspective I am suggesting here, we
also see that, inasmuch as to be a person is to be an addressor and an addressee,
and is to be one who takes oneself and others to be the subjects of intentionally
characterized states, that status is one only achievable, and only comprehensible,
in a social context. Our very being, like the institutions in the context of which
we function, is socially constructed. As Mandeville and Hume also saw clearly,
we are essentially social animals, complicated bees. One does not come to
understand a beehive by studying individual bees and scaling up; one
understands an individual bee by understanding how a hive works, and what that
bee’s role is therein.12
This may also helps us to illuminate an idea advanced by Śāntaraksita in
Ornament to the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāra) when he claims that
reflexive awareness is what distinguishes consciousness from insentient matter.
16.Consciousness arises as diametrically opposed
In nature to insentient matter.
Its nature as non-insentient
Just is the reflexivity of its awareness.

12

For more on Hume and Mandeville on the social dimension of personhood, see Garfield
(2019).
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In context, it appears that Śāntarakṣita is simply making the point that to be
genuinely conscious is to be self-conscious, distinguishing our awareness of the
sun’s position from, say, that of a sunflower or a sundial: ours is conscious
because we are aware that we are aware; theirs is not because they are not so
reflexively aware. I have criticized this argument elsewhere. (2006) But we
might adopt an alternative reading of this verse (perhaps more charitable,
perhaps more tendentious, perhaps simply a creative vamp on Śāntarakṣita in a
conversational mood): to be genuine subjects, we can imagine Śāntarakṣita
saying, is to represent ourselves as subjects; and, we might then add, to
represent ourselves as subjects is only possible in an intersubjective context. So,
on this reading, Śāntarakṣita is pointing us towards the necessary
intersubjectivity of subjectivity, even if this was not his original intention. This
is then a useful adumbration of the idea of the person as a conventionally
constituted entity, involving a creative dialogue with a classical text.
Note that it also allows anti-reductionist Buddhist philosophers such as
Śāntarakṣita a way of understanding the irreducibility of mind to the body
without a substance dualism: we might note that even if we can tell a purely
physical causal story about our bodies, we need a very different kind of story
about our intentionally characterized lives. That story will be hermeneutical, and
will rely on social conventions and processes. It will be as irreducible to the
physical story as economics is to metallurgy, or aesthetics to geometry. It is the
suggestion that for human beings, Mitsein is ontologically as well as
phenomenologically and epistemologically prior to Dasein. And it will be a story
according to which mutual recognition lies at the heart of our conscious lives.13
Buddhist philosophers had no monopoly in India on the idea that the
second person is indispensible to self-understanding. As Chakrabarti (2011, p.

It is also worth noting that while this way of reading Śāntarakṣita, may not be historically
accurate—for one thing, Śāntarakṣita is committed to reflexivity as a primitive character of all
consciousness, human and non-human; for another, he is an individualist, not a collectivist
regarding conscious experience and subjectivity—it is a plausible way to place him in dialogue both
with his contemporaries and near-contemporaries in India, and with us. It also suggests that
Śāntarakṣita provides the Buddhist tradition with the tools to refute the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti
view that we know the minds of others only inferentially, on analogy with our own, a refutation
that—while never developed within the Buddhist world—was advanced with great force by the
Kashmiri Śaiva philosopher Abhinavagupta.
13
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31) shows, the Kashimir Śaiva philosopher Abhinavagupta’s refutation of
Dharmakīrti’s analysis leads directly to a recognition of the primacy of the
second person in our subjectivity. Dharmakīrti argues that since as I observe
that my own speech is always preceded by thoughts and intentions, I can
conclude that all speech is preceded by thoughts and intentions, and apply this
entailment to the speech of others, concluding that their speech, too is always
preceded by thoughts and intentions, and so that they have minds. The argument
is cast in the standard Indian probative inference form, involving a subject
(speech), a property (preceded by thoughts and intentions), an observation of
universal concomitance that justifies the assertion of an entailment, and the
extension to a new case (the thought of others).
Abhinavagupta demonstrates (as would Wittgenstein 900 years later) that
this argument is straightforwardly fallacious.14 The only entailment to which my
observation of the concomitance of intention and speech in my own case entitles
me is that my own speech is preceded by my own intentions. This does not
validate the claim that others’ speech is preceded by others’ intentions. The only
alternative for the Buddhist, Abhinavagupta suggests, is to assume that others’
speech is a case exactly like my own, which is what is to be proven.
Instead, Abhinavagupta, as Chakrabarti puts it, “finds the You to be a
foundational middle-reality between the pure Self and the apparent Non-Self in
contrast and community with which the Self discovers its own playful knowerhood.” (32) Abhinavagupta puts the point this way:
The sense in which the addressor and the addressee, though different,
become one in the addressing is indicative of the parapara Goddess, whose
characteristic is identity in difference. (Ibid.)15
That is, it cannot be the case that we discover that others have minds by
considering the causes of their speech and behavior. For to do so, we already
must presuppose that that speech and behavior is meaningful—that it is apt for
interpretation. And to suppose that is already to suppose that they are persons
with minds, different from us in perspective and perhaps in beliefs and desires,
but identical to us nature, as co-participants in the community that constitutes
meaning in the first place, players on the same team, occupying different
positions. Just as I cannot be a halfback without a football team, I can’t be a
speaker without a community of others to address and by whom to be addressed.
14 Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśīnī 216, as translated in Chakarabarti 2011
15 Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśīnī 70-71.
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The “problem of other minds,” Abhinavagupta suggests, must have been already
solved in order even to be posed.
3. The Broader Social Dimension of Subjectivity
This broader social and normative dimension in the story of the structure of
human subjectivity sets accounts of self-knowledge and self-consciousness such
as those of Bhattacharyya, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Sellars apart from those
of more individualistic philosophers such as Husserl or Zahavi, who take first
person subjectivity to be pre-reflectively given, and take the recognition of
others to be the automatic, preflective extension of something we know from our
own side to them. Husserl and Zahavi, to be sure, recognize the essential role
of second persons in discourse, in ethics, and in our articulate selfunderstanding. Zahavi writes:
The second-person pronoun is you. This suggests that to adopt a second-person
perspective on somebody is to relate to that person as a you, rather than as a he
or she…. [R]eciprocal engagement is a crucial and distinctive component. For
me to relate to another as a you is to relate to someone, an I, who is in turn related
to me as a you. Second-person engagement is a subject-object (you-me) relation
where I am aware of and directed at the other and, at the same time, implicitly
aware of myself in the accusative, as attended to and addressed by the other.
Second-person engagement consequently involves not merely an awareness of
the other, but also, and at the same time, a form of interpersonal selfconsciousness. (2016, p. 5)

Zahavi then quotes Husserl on this point:
The origin of personality is found in empathy and in the further social acts that
grow out of it. For personality, it is not enough that the subject becomes aware
of itself as the center of its acts; rather, personality is constituted only as the
subject enters into social relations with others. (1973, p. 175, translated and
quoted at Zahavi 2016, 5)

Husserl and Zahavi argue that to see oneself as an addressee is to see oneself as
a subject and as someone recognized as a subject; to address another is to take
that other as a subject.16 To this point, they are in complete agreement with the
perspective we have been exploring. But there is a hairsbreadth of difference,
16

And, as Emily McRae notes (personal communication), withholding the second person, and
referring to another by the third person in her presence, is a potent way to convey disrespect.
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and that hair is worth splitting in this context. The question concerns epistemic
and ontological priority. Husserl and Zahavi take subjectivity to be primordially
given to us in first-person experience, and then extended to the second person;
Abhinavagupta, Bhattacharyya, Chakrabarti, Reddy, and I (and one might add
Hume and Heidegger to this mix) take the recognition of second persons to be
primordial and constitutive of first-person subjectivity.
We end up in the same place in our account of mature subjectivity, but we
differ regarding the route. And in particular, we agree that in the second-person
perspective, we do not see ourselves from the standpoint of the other, but rather
see that the other has a distinct perspective of her own. Zahavi also makes a nice
point when he argues for the priority of the second person over the third,
contrasting the intimate “we” of dyadic engagement with the anonymous “we”
of identification with a large class of third persons. (2016, pp. 63 ff) I agree
entirely with that contrast, and with the priority of the second person over the
third. On the other hand, I take it that the argument I have offered so far defends
the primordiality of the second person over the first.
Indian and Western philosophers are not alone in this field. There is also a
classical Chinese source of insight into this matter, and that is Zhuangzi’s
discussion of the “Happy Fish.” Here is the relevant passage:
One day, Zhuangzi was strolling beside the river with Huizi. Huizi, a man of
erudition, was fond of arguing. They were just crossing a bridge when Zhuangzi
aid, “The fish have come up to the surface and are swimming about at their
leisure. That is how fish enjoy themselves.” Immediately Huizi countered this
with: “You are not a fish. How can you tell what a fish enjoys?” “You are not
me,” said Zhuangzi. “How do you know that I can’t tell what a fish enjoys?” “I
am not you,” said Huizi triumphantly. “So of course I cannot tell about you. In
the same way, you are not a fish. So you cannot tell a fish’s feelings. Well—is my
logic not unanswerable?” “Wait, let us go back to the root of the argument,” said
Zhuangzi. “When you asked me how I knew what a fish enjoyed, you admitted
that you knew already whether I knew or not. I knew, on the bridge, that the fish
were enjoying themselves.” (Yukawa 2015, p. 27)

There is a wealth of commentary and a mountain of disputation regarding this
passage. (See Ames and Nakajima 2015 for a good sampler.) This is not the
place to enter into those extensive interpretative controversies. I focus in
reading this passage (as I often do when reading Zhuangzi) on the final lines.
Zhuangzi points out to Huizi that even to have this conversation, Huizi must
treat Zhuangzi as a second person: someone with a perspective different from
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his own, an object of address, and one who can himself address; but more than
that, someone who is interpretable, whose cognitive states can be known, and
whose utterances can be understood. Otherwise, even disagreement is
impossible, let alone agreement. Conversation, and hence understanding itself,
and hence humanity itself, rely on this second-person engagement. The fish are
nothing but a metaphor for this point.
Zhuangzi engages with the fish as (reduced) second persons. Whether he
is right or wrong to do so across species lines, his point is that immediate
second-person engagement is essential to who we are. Huizi’s challenge is too
strong (and again, this is not to say that there is not a weaker, fallibilist challenge
available to him): it suggests that any subjective difference, any difference in
experience or perspective makes understanding impossible. That has to be
wrong; and it is Zhuangzi’s point that that difference in perspective is what
makes second person engagement possible, and hence understanding itself
presupposes not identity but difference.
4. The Ethical Dimension: Responsiveness vs Reactivity
As I noted at the outset, this recognition of the importance of the second person
in Indian and in Western philosophy has an important ethical dimension. In
ethical discourse we are often asked to take a disinterested perspective, whether
in order to be fair, as in a Kantian framework, to be agent-neutral, as in a
Utilitarian framework, to take up the disinterested point of view in Humean
terms, or to cultivate upekṣa as in a Buddhist framework. In each case, we are
asked to develop equal regard and concern for all persons, no matter how or
whether they are related to us. This is a demand to treat third persons as we
would treat ourselves or our second-person intimates; to elide the difference
between the intimate and the anonymous “we,” in Zahavi’s terms. Does this
undermine the special regard that seems to be implied by the primacy of the
second person?
I think not, and indeed that second-person primacy helps to understand
how this perspective can be achieved. It would be one thing to understand this
as a demand either to move directly from the first person case to the third person
case, as the so-called Golden Rule might be interpreted to suggest, or to be
asked to treat all second persons as third persons, as some Kantians might
suggest. In the first case, we are asked to extend egoistic regard to all persons,
which is incoherent on its face; on the second, we are asked to treat intimates as
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strangers, which is equally morally and psychologically problematic. But these
are not the only options. The other possibility is to treat third persons as second
persons, and to extend the natural non-egoistic regard and affection we have for
intimate interlocutors to others. This is the work of moral cultivation. Hume
suggests as much when he discusses the ways in which we widen the circle of
those to whom we feel intimately related by the use of the moral imagination. 17
In the Buddhist contexts, this is the point of imagining all sentient beings as
one’s mother.
Note that the moral exercise is neither to think of all sentient beings as
oneself, nor to think of one’s mother as just like any other sentient being. Rather,
the special second-person relation one has to one’s mother is what is to be
generalized in the moral attitude. The second person has pride of place here,
and is the starting point for moral consciousness. In cultivating moral
impartiality or non-egocentricity (upekṣa̛), we do aim to attain a kind of decenteredness in moral vision, in which we no longer stand at the center of our
moral universe, but we do not aim at complete anonymity in that universe, but
rather extended intimacy with it, and that is enabled by our second-person

17 Stephen Darwall in (2006) argues for a version of second person ethics.

His approach is related
to that I develop here. Darwall relies on the idea that moral engagement involves making claims
on others, having obligations towards others, and recognizing others as making claims on us and
having obligations towards us. This idea is grounded in Strawson’s (1968) discussion of reactive
attitudes. (See Darwall 2013a, xi). Nonetheless, Darwall also notes (2013b, 92) that special
relations, and in particular, intimate relationships, require that “genuine care for others is an
attitude towards them as particular individuals and not just as “generalized others.” And
endorsing Buber’s critique of Heidegger, Darwall notes that intimate second-person
relationships require a special kind of access to oneself shared with the other. (Ibid., 112) He also
notes the primacy of parent-child relationships in establishing the ability to be with another. (130)
On the other hand, despite his nods to Hume, Hutcheson and Smith in this context, Darwall’s
position is important different from that I defend here, and this in at least two important respects.
First, Darwall takes second-person ethical relations to fall out of more general principles of
autonomy, justice and rights, that are independent of special dyadic relations; I take these special
dyads, and the intimacy they afford to ground the more general moral perspective. Second,
Darwall takes the moral point of view to be independent of affect; I take it to be essentially
affective. Third, Darwall sees our identity as constituted independently of the second person
relationships into which we enter; I see the second person as essential to constituting our
identities. So, while we share a commitment to the second person perspective as essential to moral
life, we do so for different reasons, and we connect that perspective to personhood in very different
ways.
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relationships and our ability to generalize them. Instead of seeing a You as one
of many, we aim to see the many as instances of You.18
This is made possible by the ultra-sociality of our species. We are
biologically tuned for cooperation, including cooperation with passing
acquaintances. We see this in our everyday life and in our regular interactions
with strangers, whether in commerce or casual meeting. This ultrasociality is
essential to our being—to our Dasein as well as our Mitsein. If we are to thrive,
we must thrive in a social context, and if we are to thrive in a social context, we
must be both trusting and trustworthy. Moreover, to thrive in a social context,
we must be both good at interpreting others, and we must ourselves be
interpretable. If we fail in trust, in trustworthiness, in interpretation, or in
transparency, we fail to be social, and if we fail to be social, we fail to be fully
human. It is the context of second-person interactions in which these skills are
cultivated; and what they enable is the cultivation of more, more mature, and
more varied and interlocked second-person relations.19
We know ourselves and our fellows in many guises: as knowers and
inquirers; as moral and political actors; as friends; as competitors; as lovers and
as enemies; as seekers and as teachers. Bur first and foremost, we know each
other as addressees and addressors, and so as second persons. Together we
improvise the everyday world in which we interact—lokavyāvahāra—that is the
only context in which human life can have meaning.
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